Theories in the usual sense, as characterized by a language and a set of theorems in that language ("statement view"), are related to theories in the structuralist sense, in turn characterized by a set of potential models and a subset thereof as models ("non-statement view", J. Sneed, W. Stegmuller). It is shown that reductions of theories in the structuralist sense (that is, functions on structures) give rise to so-called "representations" of theories in the statement sense and vice versa, where representations are understood as functions that map sentences of one theory into another theory. It is argued that commensurability between theories should be based on functions on open formulas and open terms so that reducibility does not necessarily imply commensurability. This is in accordance with a central claim by Stegmuller on the compatibility of reducibility and incommensurability that has recently been challenged by D. Pearce.
1. Introduction. It is a central claim within the structuralist approach to scientific theories as proposed by Sneed (1971) and further developed by Stegmuller (1973) that a theory T may be reducible to a theory T' even if T and T' are incommensurable in the sense of Kuhn. This thesis serves as an argument against the relativistic consequences to which Kuhn's approach may lead: T's being reducible to T' provides a rational reason to prefer T' to T, even if T and T' cannot be compared using the concept of commensurability. In the following it will be referred to as "Stegmiiller's thesis" since it was Stegmuller who put most emphasis on it (see Stegmuller 1973 Stegmuller , 1986 ).
That there is a close relationship between statement and non-statement view, is obvious. Although Sneed and Stegmiiller define "reduction" purely in terms of relations between sets of models, these sets must somehow be characterized linguistically when one wants to treat concrete examples. No formal system is necessary here: a mathematical characterization using set-theoretic predicates as in Suppes (1957, chap. 12 ) is sufficient. This is what Stegmuller calls the "quasi-linguistic mode of speech" (1986, p. 24). But even when characterized in such an informal way, structures are eo ipso related to formal languages. A structure is nothing but a collection of domains, relations, functions, and individuals, which can be described by a certain similarity type containing information about the arity of relations, etc. This similarity type is at the same time the similarity type of a formal language having corresponding predicate, function and individual constants in its non-logical vocabulary. This language is often first-order, though this does not imply that the considered set of structures is first-order definable. Therefore, given the abstract modeltheoretic conception of theory reduction, it is not surprising that under certain conditions it has an equivalent on the linguistic level.
Our general claim is that the Sneed-Stegmiiller conception of scientific theories would gain much argumentative clarity and intuitive plausibility if the connection between linguistic and model-theoretic concepts were given more attention. D. Pearce was the first to investigate this connection in relation to the structuralist view of science-. In his recent discussion with Balzer and Stegmiiller, Pearce (1982a, see also 1982b; and Tan 1986) argued that model-theoretically defined reducibility implies translatability and thus commensurability. Balzer (1985) defended Stegmiiller's thesis by calling into question the adequacy of Pearce's accounts of translation and of incommensurability. Stegmuller (1986) further developed some of Balzer's ideas together with an improved definition of commensurability. The present study intends to make the correspondence between concepts of the statement and non-statement views of theories more obvious than does Pearce's work. Pearce's notion of "translation" suffers from several defects. First, it is itself relativized to a reduction in the structuralist sense that is supposed to be given and thus mixes up from the very beginning the two views of theories. (So one may ask if it should be called "translation" at all, as Balzer and Stegmiiller remarked.) Contrary to that, representations in our sense are independently defined linguistic concepts and are thus more genuine explications of the idea of "translation". Secondly, Pearce's "translations" only concern languages and not theories. Nothing is required of how theorems of the reduced theory relate to the theorems of the reducing theory, a crucial aspect that seems to be overlooked by Balzer and Stegmuller. This is an additional point against the usefulness of this concept. Again, our representations also relate the theorems of the considered theories in a specific way. More precisely, we distinguish representations of languages from representations of theories, the latter being the concept in which we are really interested.
Our definition of commensurability is considerably different from Balzer's and Stegmiller's proposals in their replies to Pearce. In particular, we do not require commensurable concepts to be literally identical. Furthermore, whereas Balzer and Stegmuller work in Pearce's framework, which is based on reductions of theories in the model-theoretic sense, we do not use model-theoretic concepts in our account of "commensurability". We strictly confine ourselves to theories in the sense of the statement view and consider the meaning of the concepts of a scientific theory to be given internally by the theorems of the theory and not externally by their extensions in certain models.
As regards our definition of reduction, we follow Pearce, Balzer and Stegmuller in formulating this structuralist notion in a very restricted version, since the refinements concerning theoretical versus non-theoretical concepts, special laws and constraints do not immediately have to do with the questions investigated here.
The plan of this paper is as follows: in section 2 we present some preliminaries concerning notation and concepts used. In section 3 representations of first-order languages and related concepts are defined and basic properties are established. Section 4 extends these notions to representations of theories. In section 5 theories in the structuralist sense and reductions between them are defined. Section 6 then shows how a given reduction between theories in the structuralist sense can be used to define a corresponding representation between theories in the sense of the statement view and vice versa. In section 7 we discuss the strength and adequacy of our results in relation to Stegmuiller's thesis and propose a definition of commensurability. = R(M1 n Dom(R)). This notation also applies to functions, which are considered to be special cases of relations. We do not distinguish between sets and classes and will often refer to "sets" of structures where classes are meant.
We investigate first-order languages L and L', which differ only in their non-logical vocabulary. Intuitively, L is to be understood as the language of the reduced ("old") theory T and L' as the language of the reducing ("new") theory T', although all our formal notions and theorems are independent of this motivation. To simplify notation, we adopt the con-vention that unprimed syntactical variables relate to L and primed syntactical variables to L'. For example, if E denotes a set of sentences in L, E' denotes a set of sentences in L', and so on. Thus we will explain our notation only for L; by this convention everything extends to L' mutatis mutandis.
Except for a few places, where it is explicitly mentioned, the only logical sign of L and L' to which we will refer is negation m. (This is because negation is the only logical sign of the object-language for which a preservation property will be explicitly required.) All other logical signs (V9 31, 4,, X, &) are used metalinguistically. Sent(L) denotes the set of sentences (formulas without free variables) of L, E stands for arbitrary subsets of Sent(L), and cr (with and without indices) for elements of Sent(L) (that is, for sentences). Str(L) denotes the set of structures of the similarity type determined by the non-logical constants of L, S stands for subsets of Str(L), x and y for elements of Str(L) (that is, for structures). As usual, x l= u means that cr holds in x, and x = E that each element of E holds in x; in addition, S l= u means that cr holds in each element of S, and S k= E that each element of E holds in each element of S. E I= cr means that cr holds in all structures in which each element of E holds (that is, cr is a logical consequence of E).
We can now introduce the notion of partial consequence with respect to a set of structures S: E u=s u means that u holds in all structures of S in which each element of E holds, that is, E ks Su (Vx E S)(x F E u x F v). 
C1
Thus Rf would become a partial one-one function if its arguments were equivalence classes under and =, instead of single structures. (ii) and (iii) are immediate consequences of (i).
Now suppose S' C Dom(Rf). Then for any x' E S' there is an x E
Rf(S') such that for all u, x' I= f (u) iff x l= u. Thus x' I= f(1) implies x k , which in turn, supposing E FRf(S') u, implies that x k= u.
Therefore x' I= f(r), showing thatf(E) f, f (ir) and thus (3.1). Similarly, x' k ft(-l) iff x k mr iff not x l= o iff not x' k f (r) iff x' k -f(o-). This proves (3.2). That Rf(S') is least, follows from (iii). O
Lemma 3 implies that a weak representation f of L in L' with respect to S and S' is one with respect to Rf(S') and S' (and thus also one with respect to any S* D Rf(S') and S'). Because the parameter S can always be replaced by Rf(S'), it is, unlike S', rather unspecific forf. Note that we have required nothing of the sets of theorems 0 and 0', not even that they be deductively closed. Thus we use "theorem" in a very wide sense. In principle it is possible to consider the axioms of a theory to be "theorems" in our sense (as, for example, in the example given in section 6 after Theorem 1). In many cases, however, it would then be difficult to establish a reduction between theories, since according to (4.1) axioms of T would have to be transformned into axioms of T', and not only into consequences of axioms.
(4.1) says thatf maps theorems of the "old" theory to theorems of the "new" theory, and (4.3) that no non-theorem of the "old" theory is mapped onto a theorem of the "new" theory. These seem to be quite natural reconstructions of the idea of a "translation" between theories that not only concerns their languages but also their theorems. It might be added that our condition (4.1) has some similarity with Eberle's (1971) Mayr (1976) and found by him to be more adequate. However, we do not want to continue any detailed discussion as to the most appropriate notion of reduction. We hope that we are at least considering some important candidates. For an overview of the proposals made in the structuralist literature, see Rott (1987) . An example of a weak reduction is mentioned in section 6 aft&r Theorem 2. 6. Relating Reductions and Representations. The Central Theorems. The main result of this section will be that a weak, conversely weak or strong representation of a theory T in a theory T' with respect to sets of structures S and S' induces a weak, conversely weak or strong reduction, respectively, of a theory Tm to a theory Tm' where the theories in the non-statement sense Tm and Tm' correspond to the theories in the statement sense T and T' in a canonical way. Conversely, under certain assumptions each weak, conversely weak or strong reduction of a theory Tm to a theory Tm' induces a weak, conversely weak or strong representation, respectively, of a theory T in a theory T' with respect to sets of structures S and S', where T, S and T', S' are obtained from the respective theories Tm and Tm' in a canonical way. As regards Stegmuiller's thesis, this converse direction is even more important. Our central theorems follow straightforwardly from two lemmas that do not even require the framework of representations of languages but that are related to representations of theories in an obvious way.
LEMMA 9. Given a functionf: Sent(L) -* Sent(L') and a set S' C Str(L').
Then:
(i) f(E) C E' : Rf(Mod(E' n Ran(f)) n s') C Mod(E) n Rf(S'). (ii) f(E) D ,' n Ran(f) : R (Mod(E' n Ran(f)) n s') D Mod(E)
n R/S').
(iii) f(E) = ', n Ran(f) => R,XMod(E, n Ran(f)) n s,) =Mod(E) n Rf(S'). 
Proof. (i): If x' E Mod(E> n Ran(f)) n S', then x' I ,' n Ran(f), and so, by the assumption, x' # f(E). Hence by definition of Rf for each x such that x'R1x, x l= , that is, x E Mod(E) n Rf(S'). (ii) If x E Rf(S'), then there is a corresponding x' E S' such that x'R1x. If furthermore x E Mod(E), that is, x l= , then by definition of Rf, x' #=f(E). Thus by assumption, x' I -' ln Ran(f), which means that x E Mod(E> n Ran(f)) n s'. (iii) follows from (i) and (ii). D Under certain conditions concerning E, E' and S' even the converses of the clauses of this

(i) R(M') C M > f(Th(M)) C Th(M' n Dom(R)). (ii) R(M') D M > f(Th(M)) D Th(M' n Dom(R)) n Ran(f). (iii) R(M')-M => f(Th(M)) = Th(M' n Dom(R)) n Ran(f).
Proof. (i) if Cr E Th(M), then M l= r. Thus, assuming that R(M') C M, R(M') # r. Hence, since R C Rf, M' n Dom(R) # f(c). (Note that M' # f(Cr) does not necessarily hold since M' need not be completely contained in Dom(R).) This means that f(c) E Th(M' n Dom(R)). (ii) Iff (cr) E Th(M' rf Dom(R)), then M' n Dom(R) I= f(c). Thus, since R C Rf, R(M') # cr, by the definition of Rf. Hence, assuming that M C R(M'), M l= r. Thus Cr E Th(M). (iii) is an immediate consequence of (i) and (ii). i
Now we can prove our two main theorems. Suppose R is projectively definable. We do not want to tackle the first question in detail here. Theorem 2 mainly depends on Lemma 8, which assumes that R is projectively definable, and whose proof essentially uses the interpolation theorem, which is valid in the framework of first-order logic that we have assumed throughout this paper. In his reply to Pearce (1982a), Balzer (1985) argued that all relevant theories use at least second-order logic, for which the interpolation theorem is not available. However, even if Balzer is right in his claim that most or all of the important theories are of second or higher order (better arguments for this thesis than his own can be found in Shapiro 1985), this does not necessarily refute the applicability of Lemma 8. What is required there is only that the reduction relation R be projectively definable in a first-order language, not that all sets making up the theories considered be definable in that way. It may well be that the reduction relation R between theories Tm, (M=,M) and Tm' = (Mp',M') is projectively definable in a first-order language (and therefore also Mp, being equal to Ran(R)), even though Mp', M and M' are sets that are definable only in second-order logic. Pearce (1982b) gives arguments that in central cases R is first-order definable. In the previous section we have at no place assumed that certain sets of structures can be characterized by sets of first-order sentences. The disjointness of the non-logical vocabularies of L and L' that is also required in Lemma 8 presents no problem to us, since we may achieve it by re-labeling constants. However, it is a problem for Balzer and Stegmuller who base their commensurability concept on the identity of symbols (see below).
THEOREM 1. Given theories T = (L,O) and T' = (L',O') and a function
(i) R(M') C M, that is, (5.3). Mp C S= holds by Lemma 3 (iii). (ii) By Lemma 4 (ii) we have that S C Ran(Rf). Thus R/(R7'(S)) S_-= MP, which implies that Ran(R) = MP, that is, (5.1) is verified. Furthermore we have R(M'
)
(i) If R is a weak reduction of Tm to Tm', then there is a weak representation of T in T' with respect to any S and S' such that S D Mp and S' C Dom(R). (ii) If R is a conversely weak reduction of Tm to Tm', then there is a conversely weak representation of T in T' with respect to any S such that S C Mp and to S' = Dom(R). (iii) If R is a strong reduction of Tm to Tm', then there is a strong representation of T in T' with respect to S = Mp and S' = Dom(R).
Proof. It is obvious that T and T' are theories in
As regards the second point, we must give a definition of commensurability and show how it is related to the notions of representation. We shall now give such a definition, indeed, many, interrelated definitions. Our proposals are based on two ideas both of which make commensurability differ from representability: (i) Commensurability concerns scientific concepts and not only statements, "concept" here understood as comprising functions as well (we avoid speaking of "scientific terms" because of the possible confusion with the logical usage of "term" as opposed to "formula"). In logical terminology this means that predicate constants or, more generally, open formulas, and function constants or, more generally, open terms of one theory must be given a meaning from the viewpoint of another theory. For example, we not only want to say that an atomic sentence ul of T which has the form P(tj) is to be understood as u1' in T', U2 of the form P(t2) as U2' and U3 of the form P(t3) as U3 In the following definitions, we continue to work within our framework of partial consequence, which we developed in order to have a notion of representation that exactly corresponds to the model-theoretic notion of reduction. However, if one reads the following as an attempt to define "commensurability" independently of its relationship to model-theoretic reductions, one may well skip the reference to S and S' in reading, or, in what comes to the same thing, consider S to be Str(L) and S' to be Str(L').
Our central concept will be that of a commensurability function holds, we speak of a conversely weak X-commensurability function, and if all three of (7.4), (7.5) and (7.6) hold, of a strong X-commensurability function from L to L' with respect to S and S'. The conditions (7.1), (7.2) and (7.3) express the idea that scientific concepts, that is, predicate, function and individual constants, must be mapped to formulas, terms and individual constants, and not only sentences to sentences. (7.4), (7.5) and (7.6) are just the conditions we had before for representations, but now for formulas instead of sentences. If one is only interested in what we call a weak X-commensurability function and wants to work without partial consequence, then one may use the compactness of the first-order consequence relation # and replace (7.4) by If one wants to avoid such consequences, one has to work with "full" commensurability functions only, that is, with X-commensurability functions where X contains the whole non-logical vocabulary of L. We do not see any possibility of defining a concept of commensurability that on the one hand is restricted to a specific non-logical constant P but on the other hand respects the full meaning of P in a theory T even if in T this meaning of P is only implicitly determined together with the meanings of other constants. When we describe it as the task of an X-commensurability function to represent in T' the meaning that a constant from X has in T, "meaning" is understood as something that is specified by the theorems of T, that is, by certain laws that hold of this constant. In other words, we rely on the statement view of theories when dealing with commensurability (see section 1 above). This makes our proposal strongly differ from Balzer's and Stegmiiller's who refer to extensions in models as the meanings of non-logical constants and require equality of extensions in related models as the central criterion of commensurability (see section 1 above). Our rendering of "meaning" as something that is purely internal to a theory seems to us to be narrower to the notion of commensurability as used, for example, in discussions in the context of To complete our definitions, we say what commensurability as distinguished from commensurability functions should mean. For simplicity, we omit the specifications "weak", "conversely weak", and "strong" and also skip the reference to S and S'. It is clear how by use of these additional specifications different concepts of commensurability can be obtained. We define: T is X-commensurable in T' if there is an X-commensurability function from T to T'. T is fully commensurable in T' if T is X-commensurable in T', where X comprises all the non-logical constants of L. Similarly, a symmetric concept of commensurability can be defined: If X and X' are sets of non-logical constants of L and L', respectively, then T and T' are called (X,X')-commensurable, if T is Xcommensurable in T' and T' is X'-commensurable in T. T and T' are fully commensurable if T is fully commensurable in T' and T' is fully commensurable in T. One can obtain weaker notions of X-commensurability if one only requires that there be an X-commensurability function from T to a consistent extension of T'. According to this approach, T and T' are already commensurable with respect to certain concepts of T, if the theorems of T' do not exclude that these concepts have analogues in the framework of T', although T' may still be too weak to characterize these analogues sufficiently. (This proposal seems to correspond to the view expressed in Feyerabend 1962, p. 74-76.) Various concepts of non-commensurability can be obtained by negating the corresponding notions of commensurability. However, non-commensurability need not mean incommensurability. Intuitively, incommensurability means non-commensurability in the presence of a certain relatedness of theories. Theories that have "nothing to do with each other" are non-commensurable, but not incommensurable. To give this relatedness of theories a precise rendering is still a desideratum in the philosophy of science.
